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92k1817 Profiting from criminal activity or
advocacy thereof
(Formerly 92k90.1(1))

916 F.2d 777
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

A New York statute requiring earnings that
criminal derived from exploitation of his crime
to be deposited in an escrow account to assure
payment of civil judgments recovered by victims
was a content-based restriction on speech subject
to review under the strict scrutiny standard.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; N.Y.McKinney's
Executive Law § 632–a.

SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC., Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Gennaro FISCHETTI, George L. Grobe, Jr., Diane
McGrath, and Angelo Petromelis, Individually and
in Their Capacities as Members of the New York
State Crime Victims Board, Defendants–Appellees.

Cases that cite this headnote
No. 1044, Docket 89–9192. | Argued
March 22, 1990. | Decided Oct. 3, 1990.
Publisher brought action against members of New York State
Crime Victims Board seeking order declaring that New York
statute requiring that earnings derived from exploitation of
crime be escrowed to assure payment of civil judgments
later recovered by victims violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. On cross motions for summary judgment, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, 724 F.Supp. 170, John F. Keenan, J., found for
Board, and publisher appealed. The Court of Appeals, Miner,
Circuit Judge, held that although statute was a content-based
restriction of speech, statute was narrowly tailored to state's
strong interest in preventing criminals from profiting from
crimes while victims were in need of compensation due to
their victimization.
Affirmed.
Jon O. Newman, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.

West Headnotes (2)

[1]

Constitutional Law
Profiting from criminal activity or advocacy
thereof
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(H) Law Enforcement; Criminal
Conduct

[2]

Constitutional Law
Profiting from criminal activity or advocacy
thereof
Criminal Law
Rights to property subject of or connected
with crime
Sentencing and Punishment
Validity
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(H) Law Enforcement; Criminal
Conduct
92k1817 Profiting from criminal activity or
advocacy thereof
(Formerly 92k90.1(1))
110 Criminal Law
110XXVI Incidents of Conviction
110k1221 Rights to property subject of or
connected with crime
350H Sentencing and Punishment
350HI Punishment in General
350HI(A) In General
350Hk5 Constitutional, Statutory, and Regulatory
Provisions
350Hk8 Validity
(Formerly 110k1206.1(1))

Although a statute requiring that earnings
derived from exploitation of crime be escrowed
to assure payment of civil judgments later
recovered by victims was a content-based
restriction of freedom of expression, the statute
was valid as narrowly tailored to accomplish
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the state's strong interest in preventing criminals
from profiting from exploitation of their crimes
while victims were in need of compensation due
to their victimization. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1;
N.Y.McKinney's Executive Law § 632–a.
Cases that cite this headnote

funds for the satisfaction of civil judgments later recovered
by the victims of the exploited crimes. The challenge to the
statute is grounded in the first and fourteenth amendments.
Simon & Schuster asserts that the statute imposes a direct
restriction on speech, is therefore subject to strict scrutiny,
and cannot survive the scrutiny. The Victims Board contends
that the provision in question does not burden freedom of
speech in any way, imposes only an incidental burden if it
does and, in any event, furthers a compelling state interest in
a manner narrowly tailored to do so.

Attorneys and Law Firms
*778 Ronald S. Rauchberg (Charles S. Sims, Proskauer
Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, Mark Morril, Eric Rayman,
Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York City, of counsel), for
plaintiff-appellant.
Howard L. Zwickel, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert Abrams, Atty.
Gen. of State of N.Y., Susan L. Watson, Asst. Atty. Gen., New
York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
Leon Friedman and Arthur Eisenberg, New York City, filed
a brief for amici curiae, PEN American Center and the New
York Civil Liberties Union.
R. Bruce Rich (Robin E. Silverman, Weil Gotshal & Manges,
New York City, of counsel), filed a brief for amicus curiae,
Ass'n of American Publishers, Inc.
Before NEWMAN, MINER and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
Opinion

In granting summary judgment to the Victims Board and
denying that relief to Simon & Schuster, the district court
determined that “[t]he state's interest in compensating crime
victims is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
and any burden on free expression is merely incidental.”
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 724 F.Supp. 170, 177 (S.D.N.Y.1989). Finding
the incidental burden justified by the important interest of the
state in compensating the victims of crime, the district court
concluded that section 632–a “is not unconstitutional on its
face nor as applied to plaintiff.” Id. at 179.
We agree with Simon & Schuster that the statute in question
imposes a direct, rather than an incidental, burden on speech
and that it therefore must meet the requirements of the
strict scrutiny test to survive the constitutional challenge.
We conclude, however, that the statute meets the test
and accordingly affirm the judgment, although on grounds
different from those relied on by the district court.

MINER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Simon & Schuster, Inc. (“Simon &
Schuster”) appeals from a judgment entered in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Keenan, J.) upon an order granting the motion of defendantsappellees, Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Board (“Victims Board”), for summary judgment pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and denying its own motion for the same
relief. Simon & Schuster, a leading book publisher, brought
this action to challenge the constitutionality of section 632–
a of the New York Executive Law. N.Y. Exec. Law § 632–a
(McKinney 1982 & Supp.1990). Section 632–a requires that
the profits derived by a criminal from the exploitation of his
or her crime be deposited as earned in an escrow account
maintained by the Victims Board as a means of preserving

BACKGROUND
Originally enacted in 1977 and amended three times
thereafter, section 632–a of the New York Executive Law
provides that each
legal entity contracting with any
person or the representative or
assignee of any person, accused or
convicted of a crime in this state,
with respect to the reenactment of
such crime, by way of a movie,
book, magazine article, tape recording,
phonograph record, radio or television
presentation, live entertainment of
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any kind, or from the expression
of such accused or convicted
person's thoughts, feelings, opinions
or emotions regarding such crime,
shall submit a copy of such contract
to the [Crime Victims B]oard *779
and pay over to the [B]oard any
moneys which would otherwise, by
terms of such contract, be owing to the
person so accused or convicted or his
representatives.
N.Y.Exec.Law § 632–a(1); see 1977 N.Y. Laws 823; 1978
N.Y. Laws 417; 1986 N.Y. Laws 74.
The statute directs that the Victims Board deposit the monies
so received “in an escrow account for the benefit of and
payable to any victim or the legal representative of any victim
of crimes committed by: (i) such convicted person; or (ii)
by such accused person, but only if such accused person is
eventually convicted of the crime.” N.Y.Exec.Law § 632–
a(1). To gain access to the funds, the victim must recover a
money judgment in a civil action brought against the criminal
within five years of the establishment of the escrow account.
Id. Civil judgments obtained by crime victims rank third in
the order of priority of claims that may be paid out of the
escrow account. Id. § 632–a(11)(c) (McKinney Supp.1990).
According to the statute, the order of priority, from first
to fifth, is as follows: attorney's fees granted by a court of
competent jurisdiction for representation of the accused at
any stage of the criminal proceedings and expenses allowed
by the Victims Board for the production of monies paid
into the escrow account, the total of such fees and expenses
not to exceed one-fifth of the account; subrogation claims
of the state for payments made to a victim, not to exceed
one-half of the civil judgment obtained by a victim; victims'
civil judgments; judgments of other creditors and claims
of persons presenting lawful demands through the person
accused or convicted of the crime, including the demands
of tax authorities; and the claims of the person accused or
convicted of the crime. Id. § 632–a(11)(a)–(e).
This action tests the requirements imposed by the statute
upon book publishers generally and Simon & Schuster in
particular. It had its genesis in a decision made at the highest
levels of the Simon & Schuster organization to commission a
book dealing with the life and activities of a career criminal

named Henry Hill. At the time that Hill came to the attention
of the publisher, he was cooperating with state and federal
prosecutors under the Federal Witness Protection Program.
The idea of the book was to demonstrate the pedestrian
activities of a low-level member of a criminal enterprise and
to dispel commonly-held romantic notions about life in a
crime “family.” For the project, Simon & Schuster sought
out Sterling Lord, a prominent literary agent, for assistance
in finding an author willing to write the book in cooperation
with Hill. Lord found Nicholas Pileggi, an experienced crime
writer, and ultimately negotiated a book contract subscribed
by Hill, Pileggi and Simon & Schuster on September 1, 1981.
An earlier agreement, dated August 21, 1981, to which Hill,
Pileggi and Lord were parties, provided for the division of
payments to be received from the publisher. There seems to
be no question that Hill would not have agreed to participate
in the project without the assurance he would be paid.
Pileggi spent more than three hundred hours with Hill, who
provided the author with extensive information about his life
in crime. The result of their collaboration was a popular and
widely-acclaimed book, originally published by Simon &
Schuster in January of 1986, bearing the title Wiseguy. The
book describes in detail the crimes in which Hill participated
during his career as a “wiseguy” or hoodlum: bribery, assault,
extortion, theft, burglary, arson, drug dealing, credit card
fraud and murder. Among the more celebrated crimes in
which he was involved were the theft of nearly six million
dollars in cash and jewelry from the Lufthansa terminal at
Kennedy airport and the bribery of Boston College basketball
players. Although he served brief prison terms, Hill was
prosecuted for only a few of the crimes admitted to in the
book. Needless to say, there were many, many victims of
the crimes committed by Henry Hill, and a great number of
those victims are identified in Wiseguy. According to Simon
& Schuster, more than 90,000 copies of the book in its trade
edition have been sold, and more than one million copies of a
soft cover edition, published in February of 1987, are in print.
*780 On January 31, 1986, counsel for the Victims Board
wrote to Simon & Schuster: “It has come to our attention that
you may have contracted with a person accused or convicted
of a crime for the payment of monies to such person.” Citing
section 632–a of the Executive Law, the counsel called upon
the publisher to provide the Victims Board with copies of “all
such contracts,” the dollar amounts and dates of payments
to Henry Hill, and certain other information stemming from
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the publication of Wiseguy. By letter dated May 22, 1986,
Simon & Schuster provided to the Victims Board the dates
and amounts of payments made by the publisher “to the
Sterling Lord Agency for the account of Mr. Hill.” The
total of the amounts shown was $96,250. Enclosed with the
letter were copies of the August 21, 1981 and September
1, 1981 agreements, as well as copies of two agreements
extending the manuscript delivery date. Simon & Schuster
has suspended further payments to Hill, as requested by the
Victims Board.
On June 15, 1987, the Victims Board served upon Simon
& Schuster a Notice and a Proposed Determination and
Order. Among the proposed findings were the following:
the September 1, 1981 Contract “is of the type regulated by
Executive Law § 632–a” and “a copy of such Contract should
have been turned over to the Crime Victims Board in 1981 at
the time of execution”; the book Wiseguy “contains thoughts,
feelings, opinions and emotions regarding crimes committed
by Henry Hill as well as his admission to involvement in such
crimes”; all payments to “Hill or his representatives under the
Contract must be turned over to the Crime Victims Board to
be held in escrow for victims of crimes committed by Henry
Hill”; no payments due Nicholas Pileggi, who is a co-author
and not a representative of Hill, are “subject to the mandate
of Executive Law § 632–a”; and Sterling Lord is entitled
to “make application to the Board for payment of necessary
expenses for the production of monies paid into the escrow
account to be established by the Board.”
In accordance with the proposed findings, the Victims Board
proposed to order that Hill pay over to the Board all monies
theretofore received, plus interest, less commissions paid to
Sterling Lord; that in the event Hill failed to do so, Simon &
Schuster “shall turn over to the Board the total of monies it
wrongfully distributed to Henry Hill”; that Simon & Schuster
transfer to the Board all payments due Hill, “including the
$27,958 presently held, as well as any and all future royalties
or other monies that would otherwise be payable to Henry
Hill or his representatives under the Contract”; and that
Sterling Lord pay to the Board any monies received as Hill's
representative from Simon & Schuster “as well as any other
past or future monies received or to be received from the
Contract on account of Henry Hill.” No fact-finding having
been requested by Simon & Schuster or any other person,
the Proposed Determination and Order became the Final

Determination and Order of the Victims Board on July 15,
1987 in conformity with the Notice served by the Board.
The action giving rise to the appeal before us, brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) to enforce rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, was commenced on August 3,
1987 as a consequence of the Victim Board's order. Sought
in the prayer for relief in Simon & Schuster's complaint
were: an order declaring section 632–a violative of the first
and fourteenth amendments “on its face and as applied”; an
injunction prohibiting the Victims Board “from taking any
steps to apply or enforce” the statute; and an order awarding
attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Some time after
the filing of an Answer by the Victims Board, cross-motions
for summary judgment were filed. On September 19, 1988
the motions came on for argument before Judge Keenan,
who granted the motion of the Victims Board and denied the
motion of Simon & Schuster in a comprehensive Opinion and
Order filed on October 26, 1989.
Addressing the first amendment challenge, Judge Keenan
wrote:
Applying [United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88
S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (statute criminalizing
destruction *781 of draft card is not directed at
expressive activity and imposes incidental restriction on
First Amendment freedom no greater than is essential) ] to
section 632–a, the Court finds first that the New York state
legislature acted within its authority in enacting the statute.
Both parties agree that victim compensation is necessary
and that the most effective means of compensating crime
victims should be developed. Related to this authority,
then, is the important governmental interest of victim
compensation. The Court has determined that this interest
is unrelated to the freedom of expression. As has been
discussed, the interest in compensating victims does not
involve suppressing speech, but merely attaching the
proceeds of that speech for the benefit of the victim.
Finally, the Court finds that any incidental restriction on
the First Amendment freedom imposed by section 632–a
is no greater than is essential for the government's interest
in compensating crime victims. The law is drawn not to
prohibit expressive activity, but to garnish the proceeds
so that they will be used in a productive manner. The
statute reaches only proceeds from expressive activity for
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the purpose of preventing a criminal from directly profiting
from his or her crime.
724 F.Supp. at 178–79.
The district court also rejected Simon & Schuster's fourteenth
amendment claim that the statute is overbroad and vague.
That claim is not advanced on appeal.

sufficient number of people signed an initiative petition. The
same statute made it a felony to pay petition circulators. The
Supreme Court, after concluding that the Meyer case involved
a restriction subject to “exacting scrutiny,” id. at 420, 108
S.Ct. at 1891, held that “[t]he Colorado statute prohibiting the
payment of petition circulators imposes a burden on political
expression that the State has failed to justify.” Id. at 428, 108
S.Ct. at 1895.

[1] We think that the District Court erred in testing section
632–a under the standards established in United States v.
O'Brien. The statute addressed in O'Brien prohibited the
destruction of draft cards and therefore was not directed
at speech, although it imposed an incidental burden on
expression. The Supreme Court held that “a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms.” O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376, 88 S.Ct. at 1678–
79. To pass constitutional muster, a statute implicating such
limitations must 1) be enacted within the constitutional
power of the government, 2) further a substantial interest of
government not related to suppression of free speech and 3)
not impose incidental limitations greater than are essential to
the governmental interest. Id. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. It is this
test that the district court applied to section 632–a, despite the
Supreme Court's requirement “that the governmental interest
in question be unconnected to expression in order to come
under O'Brien's less demanding rule.” Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2541, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989).

The district court distinguished the statute examined in Meyer
from section 632–a on the ground that the former “abridged
*782 the right to engage in political speech which is at
the ‘core’ of the First Amendment,” while the latter “has no
abridging effect on political speech” and “merely functions
to prevent criminals from capitalizing on their crimes.” 724
F.Supp. at 177. A distinction based upon political advocacy
does not seem to us to be a valid one. According to Meyer,
the notion that the solicitation of petition signatures involves
protected speech follows from Schaumberg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d
73 (1980), a case involving regulation of the financial aspects
of charitable solicitation and not core political speech. 486
U.S. at 422, n. 5, 108 S.Ct. at 1892, n. 5; see also Riley v.
National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 787–88, 108 S.Ct.
2667, 2672–73, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988); Secretary of State
of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959–
60, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2848, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). Protected
expression comes in many forms other than ideological or
political speech. Indeed, the first amendment guarantee has
been held to extend to the performance of musical and
dramatic work. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 65, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2180, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981).

It cannot be said that the governmental interest advanced by
section 632–a bears no relation to expression, since the statute
burdens directly the speech of those who wish to tell (and
sell) the stories of their crimes. The possibility of a payday
five years or more down the road, depending on claims
against the escrow fund, can hardly be seen as providing an
adequate financial incentive. Without a financial incentive to
relate their criminal activities, most would-be storytellers will
decline to speak or write. It is now settled that the denial of
payment for expressive activity constitutes a direct burden
on that activity. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422–24, 108
S.Ct. 1886, 1892–93, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988). The statute
examined in Meyer allowed proposals to amend the Colorado
constitution to be placed on the ballot at a general election if a

As has been demonstrated, the statute under attack here
has the effect of excluding from circulation the expression
of criminals who would write about their crimes if the
price were right. However, “[f]or the State to enforce a
content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45,
103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). Section 632–a
also serves to single out the media for differential treatment
based on expressive content, since no assets other than
those derived from the recounting of the criminal's story
are subject to attachment in the manner provided by the
statute. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481

DISCUSSION
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U.S. 221, 227–31, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1726–29, 95 L.Ed.2d 209
(1987). Such differential treatment also must survive the strict
scrutiny test: a state interest that is compelling and legislation
narrowly constructed to accomplish its purpose. Id. at 231,
107 S.Ct. at 1728.
[2] It cannot be gainsaid that the state has a very strong
interest in preventing criminals from profiting from their
crimes. See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511–12, 22 N.E.
188, 190 (1889); cf. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2654, 105 L.Ed.2d
528 (1989) (governmental interest in depriving criminal of
economic power derived from crime). But the state has a
much stronger, indeed a compelling, interest in assuring that
a criminal not profit from the exploitation of his or her crime
while the victims of that crime are in need of compensation by
reason of their victimization. The statute in question cannot
provide assurance that all criminals will not profit from the
exploitation of their wrong-doing. Even under the statute,
criminals may receive payments deposited in the escrow fund
by publishers if no victims come forward with claims or if
funds remain after all claims are paid. A great societal interest
is served, however, in barring criminals from profiting at
the expense of victims who are in need of compensation
and press their demands for restitution. Our society rightly
deems it fundamentally unfair for a criminal to be paid for
recounting the story of his or her crime while the victim
remains uncompensated for financial loss occasioned by the
crime.
The compelling state interest that spawned the enactment of
section 632–a by the New York legislature is revealed in the
legislative history:
Currently a person may commit
a crime causing much damage
and personal injury, and then gain
substantial financial benefits related
to resulting publicity. This bill will
ensure that monies received by the
criminal under such circumstances
shall first be made available to
recompense the victims of that crime
for their loss and suffering. The
requirement of a civil action will
prevent the abuse of this privilege.

See Assembly Bill Memorandum Re: A 9019, July 15,
1977, reprinted in Legislative *783 Bill Jacket, 1977 N.Y.
Laws 823. The Division of Criminal Justice Services also
recognized the compelling state interest in a letter of support
for the legislation addressed to the Governor's counsel:
Though hardly a new phenomenon, there has been a recent
realization by the general public that where a defendant
is a well-known personality or the crime with which he
is charged is one that has aroused a high degree of public
interest, he is in a position to make a considerable amount
of money from articles, books or television accounts of his
life, times and crimes....
[T]his bill takes cognizance of the situation and seeks to
redirect the money flow from the criminal to his victims. As
an expression of the concept of simple justice it cannot be
faulted. It is merely another facet of the oft-repeated maxim
that crime does not (or should not) pay.
See Memorandum from Robert Schlanger, Division of
Criminal Justice Services, to Judah Gribetz (August 3, 1977),
reprinted in Legislative Bill Jacket, 1977 N.Y. Laws 823.
The purpose of the statute, of course, is not to suppress speech
but to assure that funds are set aside out of profits derived
by criminals from the exploitation of their crimes and made
available for the payment of judgments later recovered by the
victims of the crimes exploited. In this way, the compelling
state interest described above is served. A statute of this type
has other purposes as well. It “not only prevents a criminal's
unjust enrichment, but also it: (1) decreases the likelihood that
society will have to support victims of crime through social
programs; (2) satisfies victims' sense of justice and desire
for retribution; and (3) increases the criminal's awareness of
the consequences of his crime.” Okuda, Criminal Antiprofit
Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of Their Constitutionality, 76
Calif.L.Rev. 1353, 1367 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
It seems to us that section 632–a is narrowly tailored to the
State's interest in denying criminals any gain from the stories
of their crimes until the victims of those crimes are fully
compensated for all losses arising out of their victimization.
The statute recognizes that the only way a criminal can profit
directly from a specific crime involving a particular victim,
other than by obtaining any proceeds of the crime itself,
is by writing or talking about or reenacting it. The statute
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also recognizes that, as a practical matter, the sole asset of
most criminals is the right to tell the story of their crimes.
The first amendment right to speak is restricted only as a
consequence of their inability to profit until the victim is
compensated. Section 632–a is designed to tie up the proceeds
until victims have had an opportunity to make their claims for
compensation. It provides a specialized form of attachment
and is designed to freeze the proceeds of storytelling by
criminals for the benefit of those whose misfortunes gave rise
to the story.
As to Simon & Schuster's argument that New York Civil
Practice Law & Rules article 62 (McKinney 1980 &
Supp.1990), the general statutory provision for attachment
in New York, is sufficient to assure satisfaction of potential
judgments by victims, it suffices to say that the provisions of
article 62 simply are too limited to fulfill the State's interest
in seeing that victims are the first to be compensated from
the proceeds of crime story exploitation. While article 62,
like section 632–a, serves a security purpose by requiring
that property be held for satisfaction of possible future
judgments, it is restricted to situations where the defendant:
is a nondomiciliary residing outside New York or a foreign
corporation not qualified to do business in New York; is a
resident or domiciliary who cannot be served despite diligent
efforts to do so; has disposed of, removed or secreted property
or is about to do so, with intent to defraud creditors or frustrate
a possible judgment; or is defending an action based on a
judgment entitled to full faith and credit. N.Y.Civ.Prac.L.
& R. 6201. Recovery by many crime victims would be
rendered impossible if attachment were limited to one of these
categories.
Simon & Schuster also contends that section 632–a is not well
tailored because it is both underinclusive and overinclusive.
It *784 is said to be underinclusive as applied in this case
because it is addressed to only one kind of book and the
royalties derived therefrom. In this connection, Simon &
Schuster notes that the statute fails to reach such income
as might be earned by a thief hired as a consultant for his
or her expertise or received as royalties from other kinds
of books. The answer to the underinclusiveness argument
is that if the compelling state interest is to compensate
victims of crimes out of the proceeds of the sale of stories
of their victimization before anyone else benefits, the statute
narrowly is drawn to do just that. The general expertise
derived by a thief from a series of thefts is not the same as

the tale of a specific theft committed against an identifiable
victim. Payment for expertise, royalties from books that do
not describe crime victims, and other income and assets
of criminals may be reached in other ways. Section 632–a
deals with readily identifiable, locatable funds that are most
commonly available to those who victimize others.
The overinclusiveness of the statute is said to lie in its
application to books in which particular crimes constitute
only a small part of the subject matter, in its application
to the entire proceeds due the criminal author from each
book covered, and in reaching payments that constitute
compensation for the labors of authorship rather than the
property of the victim or the fruits of unjust enrichment. These
claims of overinclusiveness must be rejected. Section 632–a
does not eliminate a criminal's right to speak about a crime,
nor does it prevent all payment for the story of the crime.
It merely serves to tie up the proceeds of the story until the
victim is able to get the first crack at the fund. This is no
more than is required by the compelling state interest we have
identified. That interest requires that the entire proceeds due
the criminal be available to the victim, whether or not the
victim's story is a small or large part of the book. The income
is derived from the notoriety of the criminal rather than from
his or her labors. When that notoriety comes at the expense of
a victim in need of compensation and restitution, the income
so derived should be available to the victim.

CONCLUSION
We conclude that section 632–a meets the strict scrutiny test
of constitutionality and affirm the judgment of the district
court.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
There are times when well-intentioned legislators, acting
for the best of reasons, enact a statute that violates the
Constitution. When that occurs, courts are challenged to resist
the passions of the moment that swayed the legislators and
to apply the paramount restrictions of the Constitution. This
case presents such a challenge.
The New York legislature, responding to the public outrage
over the 1977 “Son of Sam” murders and to the prospect
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that the killer, when apprehended, might write a book about
his crimes, enacted a statute intended to prevent criminals
from profiting from their crimes. See N.Y.Exec.Law § 632–
a (McKinney 1982 & Supp.1990). That laudable purpose,
which New York is free to carry out in a variety of
ways, including comprehensive victim restitution provisions,
resulted in a statute that violates the First Amendment.
Because the Court upholds the statute, thereby impairing First
Amendment protections and depriving the public of valuable
writings about activities of high public interest, I respectfully
dissent.
All members of the panel are in agreement that section
632–a imposes such a direct burden on free expression
that its constitutionality is to be tested under standards
of “strict scrutiny.” See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,
108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988). We also agree
that among the components of the strict scrutiny standard
in the area of free expression are requirements that the
challenged statute is narrowly tailored to advance important
governmental interests and that any distinction made by the
statute concerning speech in general or speech of particular
content must be “necessary to serve a compelling state
interest” and “narrowly *785 drawn to achieve that end.”
See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 231, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1728, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987). We
disagree on whether section 632–a meets these exacting tests.
The application of the statute only to speech, and, more
significantly, only to speech of specified content, is beyond
dispute. The statute does not require that all payments to
criminals be escrowed for the benefit of crime victims; it
applies only to payments made to those who write books
or use other forms of communication. And, rather than
apply to all payments to criminals who write books, it
applies only to those payments made to criminals who write
books in which they express “thoughts, feelings, opinions,
or emotions” regarding their crimes. N.Y.Exec.Law § 632–
a(1). The opportunity to sell books on a variety of other
topics, enhanced for many criminals by the fame resulting
from their crimes, is not disturbed by this statute. Thus,
John Ehrlichman can write novels with no concern that his
royalties, doubtless augmented by the fame attending his
Watergate crimes, will be held for five years to pay claims
of victims or other creditors. The content-based application
of the statute is vividly illustrated by the decision of the New
York Crime Victims Compensation Board, which administers

the statute, to apply it to Jean Harris's autobiography, Stranger
in Two Worlds, because two chapters, containing primarily
testimony from her trial, referred to her crime. See Children of
Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 143 Misc.2d 999, 541 N.Y.S.2d
894 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Cty.1989), aff'd, App.Div., 556 N.Y.S.2d
483 (1st Dep't 1990). Had the book concerned exclusively
conditions at Bedford Hills prison, Harris's royalties, though
enhanced by the notoriety of her crime, would not have been
escrowed for the family of her victim.
The Court responds to the content-based discrimination of
section 632–a in two ways, neither of which, in my view, is
valid. First, the Court applies a legal analysis that defines the
state interest being advanced in terms of the statute's scope,
thereby reaching the circular result that the scope of the statute
is precisely tailored to the state's objective. But the question
in all such cases is whether a state, consistent with the First
Amendment, can pursue its objective by focusing on speech
of particular content. New York is entitled to escrow for
the benefit of crime victims all payments to criminals. The
question is whether it can escrow only payments to criminals
who write books and, even if that is so, whether it can escrow
only payments to criminals who write books about their
crimes. To say that New York can do so because escrowing
this narrow category of payments benefits crime victims,
an objective New York is anxious to achieve, eliminates
the entire inquiry concerning the validity of content-based
discriminations. Every content-based discrimination could
be upheld by simply observing that the state is anxious to
regulate the designated category of speech. It could have
been said as easily in Arkansas Writers that the tax was
valid because it achieved the state's objective of raising
revenue from the category of publications within the statute's
coverage. The Supreme Court, however, was not so easily
satisfied, and the Arkansas tax statute that discriminated
among types of publications was held to violate the First
Amendment.
Next, the Court upholds the content-based discrimination on
the factual ground that “as a practical matter, the sole asset of
most criminals is the right to tell the story of their crimes.”
916 F.2d at 783. In the first place, I doubt that this assertion
is true, and I am confident that it has not been established
either in the record of this case or, if it is a legislative fact, in
the proceedings of the New York legislature, which held no
hearings on the “Son of Sam” law. Of all criminals who might
be liable for restitution, many have assets independent of the
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proceeds of their crimes. Crime is not exclusively an activity
of the poor. And many poor criminals whose crimes involve
the taking of property have at least some of that property
available for restitution when they are arrested. Thus, I think
it unlikely that the opportunity to write about their crimes
is the sole or even principal asset of most criminals. My
*786 guess is that very few criminals have a crime story
worth selling and that their number is far less than the sum
of criminals with assets independent of their crime proceeds
plus impoverished criminals in possession of such proceeds
when arrested.
Second, and more fundamentally, even if it were true that the
sole asset of most criminals is the right to tell the story of
their crime, that observation would not validate New York's
content-based regulation of speech. A state cannot select
speech of a particular content for regulation just because such
speech is a major part of an area of relevant activity that
the state has elected not to regulate in full. The tax on a
particular category of publications invalidated in Arkansas
Writers would not have been saved from invalidation under
the First Amendment even if the taxable revenues of the
covered publications had accounted for most of the taxable
revenues of all publications.
Recognizing that a content-based discrimination cannot be
upheld if a legitimate state objective can be achieved by
reasonably available alternative means, the Court rejects the
possibility of using New York's attachment laws to secure
for crime victims all profits realized by criminals, including
book profits. This rejection rests on the view that New York's
attachment remedies are currently too limited to be used by
many crime victims. If that is so, the answer required by the
First Amendment is to broaden the remedies, not to select
books about crime for special regulation.
To whatever extent the majority relies on a state interest in
assuaging the discomfort of victims distressed that a criminal
is profiting from his crime, that interest is unavailing for
several reasons. First, alleviating public outrage is not an
interest that the First Amendment permits government to
advance by regulating books and other forms of expression.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2544,
105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 55–56, 108 S.Ct. 876, 881–82, 99 L.Ed.2d
41 (1988). Second, though the New York statute deters
the publication of crime accounts by those who commit or

are only accused of committing crimes and will result in
preventing publication of some accounts, it does not prohibit
such writings. Publishers who can find people willing to
have their advance royalties escrowed for five years can
still publish accounts of crime written or facilitated by the
accused, and victims will still be distressed by knowing
that criminals have pocketed all profits remaining after
claims of victims and other creditors. Finally, the “victim
outrage,” interest suffers from the same defect as the “victim
compensation” interest—though the interest can be validly
advanced by regulating all profits of crime, it cannot be
advanced, consistent with the First Amendment, by singling
out books of specified content for special regulation.
In addition to the fundamental vice of a content-based
regulation of speech that is underinclusive, other aspects
of section 632–a render it highly offensive to the First
Amendment. Subsection 632–a(1) requires a publisher to
submit to the Board all contracts and payments for books
within the scope of the statute to be written by those accused
of crime, not just those convicted. Though escrowed funds
will be returned in the event of an acquittal, the statute deters,
and in many cases prevents, the payment of advances for
covered books to all persons accused of crime, even those
later determined to be innocent. Many publishers will decline
to make advance payments, rather than take the risk that
the author claiming to be innocent will be convicted. From
the undisputed affidavits in this case, it is clear that the
prohibition of such advances will deter the writing of books
by many innocent persons falsely accused of crime.
Another vice of the statute is the interpretation, applied by
the Board in this case, that makes a publisher liable for any
payments made to an author that are later determined to be
covered by the statute in the event that the author declines
to turn over the payments to the Board. That threat of a
retroactive liability will make publishers extremely reluctant
to make advances for books even arguably within the *787
scope of the statute, a reluctance that, according to the
undisputed affidavits, has already led to decisions not to
publish books of high public interest.
Furthermore, the statute's coverage of contracts and payments
for books that include only a brief reference to an author's
crime or even to his “thoughts” about his crime will
inevitably tend to impel publishers to purge manuscripts of
all material arguably within the scope of the statute in order
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to escape its coverage and the risk of retroactive liability. The
undisputed affidavits report that this has already occurred.
Such governmentally induced suppression of speech is
anathema to the First Amendment.
New York understandably wishes to make sure that crime
victims receive restitution from those who perpetrate
crimes. To achieve that objective New York has enacted
a comprehensive restitution statute, authorizing sentencing
judges in every case to order restitution. N.Y. Penal Law §
60.27 (McKinney 1987). Nothing in the Constitution prevents
enactment of such a comprehensive statute providing for
restitution to crime victims. If that statute needs strengthening
to increase its effectiveness, New York is free to adopt needed
reforms. However, when New York, understandably outraged
by the prospect that a criminal might profit from a book about
his crime, tries to enact a victim restitution statute that applies
only to protected speech, rather than all income-producing
activity, and, then, only to speech of specified content, rather
than all speech, it encounters First Amendment obstacles that
in my judgment are insuperable.
Moreover, this statute is ill suited even to its objective of
aiding victims. In the first eleven years of its operation,
it has produced just five escrow accounts, three of which
involved the same criminal. What little benefit to a handful
of victims has thereby been achieved is more than offset by
the royalties that would have been earned on books that were
not published because of this statute. Such royalties would
have been available for victim restitution under New York's
existing restitution statute, which is not confined to books,
much less to books with specified content.

End of Document

The issue of how best to secure restitution for crime
victims involves policy judgments for the state legislature.
Whether this statute employs a technique permitted by the
First Amendment, however, is an issue ultimately to be
decided by the judiciary. Any statute that has the obvious
effect of preventing the publication of matters of legitimate
public interest is constitutionally suspect. “Regulations which
permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the
content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First
Amendment.” Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648–49,
104 S.Ct. 3262, 3267, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984). We do not
know how many books will not be published because of the
existence of the challenged statute. Wiseguy, the book at issue
in this case, and its film adaptation, GoodFellas, may not be
profound additions to public understanding of crime, but they
are significant contributions. The evidence is undisputed that
observance of the requirements of the “Son of Sam” law when
the book contract was first negotiated would have prevented
the writing of this book. And its publisher does not engage in
hyperbole by inviting us to consider whether it or any other
firm would have published Where Do We Go From Here ?
by Martin Luther King, Jr., Witness by Whitaker Chambers,
or On Civil Disobedience by Henry David Thoreau, had the
crimes of these authors been committed in New York State
while section 632–a was in effect.
From the judgment upholding the constitutionality of section
632–a, I respectfully dissent.

All Citations
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